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“The parent who leaves his son enormous wealth generally deadens the talents and ener-
gies of the son, and tempts him to lead a less useful and less worthy life than he otherwise
would.”
Andrew Carnegie 1891.
1 Introduction
It is highly rare for a family fortune to last more than three generations. It is so much so
that the well-known adage, often attributed to Andrew Carnegie, “Shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves
in three generations” exists in different versions worldwide.1 Its message is supported by a
recent study by Cochell and Zeeb (2005) who found that 6 out of 10 families lose their
fortunes by the end of the second generation and 9 out of 10 by the end of the third.
Nevertheless, the idea of building a family legacy that lasts long after you are gone is not
only appealing but possible. In fact there are many famous families, like the Rockefellers or
the Rothschilds, that have built impressive patrimonies which have lasted, or are likely to
last, more than 100 years. However, there is also an important proportion of families who
do not receive any patrimony and/or may not be able to build one to start with.2
The main goal of this paper is twofold: (i) to propose a microeconomic framework that is
able to explain the observed variety of wealth accumulation patterns within a family lineage,3
and (ii) to use the proposed setting in contexts with heterogenous dynasties to provide a
new explanation for some macroeconomic issues such as class structure, social mobility, the
demise of the rich bourgeoisie, and wealth inequalities.
The two key ingredients of the model we propose are the “hunger for accumulation” and
the “willingness to exert effort”. The first is a parameter related to Max Weber’s theory of
the “spirit of capitalism”, wherein accumulating wealth has value in itself. The inclusion of
direct preferences over transmitted wealth typically takes the formulation of either “spirit
1Precisely this adage comes from an antique chinese proverb, “Rice paddy to rice paddy in 3 generations”.
The japanese, indian, and british versions are, respectively, “Kimono to kimono in 3 generations”, “Sandals
to sandals in 3 generations”, and “Clogs to clogs in 3 generations”.
2According to Kennickell (2006) only 20% of families receives any inheritance (40% at the top 5% of the
wealth distribution). However, Kopczuk and Lupton (2007) estimates that about 75% of a representative
sample of elderly single households has a desire to leave an estate with positive net worth. The magnitude
of this desire is both statistically and economically significant.
3There is little works on the analysis of long-run wealth dynamics within a dynasty. Arrondel and Grange
(2006) provide a review of this literature as well as a study based on French data from 1800.
1
of capitalism” or “pure joy of giving”. Although these two specifications are, as it will be
discussed later, extremely similar, the “spirit of capitalism” has been used by many authors
who have tried to explain growth4 and/or savings (see, recently, Carroll 2000, De Nardi 2004,
Galor and Moav 2006 or Pestieau and Thibault 2012). Consistent with empirical evidence,
differently from “pure joy of giving”, it generates the properties that the average propensity
to bequest is an increasing function of wealth and that the wealth held by an individual does
not always have an inherited component.
The second key ingredient is related to the introduction of a choice variable for effort
which allows taking into account the predisposition towards working or, alternatively, the
entrepreneurial attitude. According to recent findings in psychology (see Bowles and Gintis
2002) people have different beliefs about the determinants of an individual’s social status.
Some think that the rich are rich because of “hard work” and the poor are poor because
of “laziness”. Others think that the rich (poor) are rich (poor) because of (lack of) “luck”
or “family money or connections”. In our setting the willingness to exert effort will play a
crucial role in the interaction between inherited wealth, effort (labor) supply, and transmitted
wealth.5 Such interplay reveals in which circumstances these different beliefs can be justified.
At the beginning of the 20th century the liberal economist Franck Knight pointed out
three main determinants of the accumulation and transmission of wealth: heritage, effort,
and luck. Although our basic setting is based only on heritage and effort, a simple form
of luck will be considered as an extension. Modeling luck typically requires the use of
stochastic processes, which makes the analysis of the dynamics extremely complicated. In
fact, works that follow this direction focus on the distribution of wealth in the steady-
state. By abstracting from this form of luck we can explicitly study the dynamics of wealth
accumulation. Consequently our approach can be viewed as complementary to those studies
of wealth accumulation that consist of the calibration of stochastic growth models or of
theoretical models with human capital considerations or imperfect credit markets.
Our basic setup considers the problem of different members of a given family lineage.
Each member of a dynasty chooses how much to consume, how much wealth to leave to the
next generation, and whether to exert effort. Even in the absence of any source of uncertainty
4Recently, Galor and Michalopoulos (2012) advance the hypothesis that a Darwinian evolution of en-
trepreneurial spirit plays a significant role in the process of economic development and in the time path of
inequality within and across societies.
5Using data for Swedish men, Björklund, Jäntti and Roemer (2012) reveal that several circumstances are
important for long-run inequality, but that variations in individual effort account for the most part of that
inequality.
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or capital market imperfections, our framework allows generating a (large) variety of long-
run dynamics (hereafter LRD) of wealth and effort choice. For instance, contrary to the
“pure joy of giving”, the “spirit of capitalism” allows generating both the dynamics of the
numerous households with near zero wealth (i.e., from a certain period, all generations work
and choose not to transmit any wealth) and the one symbolized by the famous “Shirtsleeves to
shirtsleeves” adage (i.e., from a certain period, there is periodically one generation who does
not work and completely squanders all the wealth accumulated by the preceding generations).
Our microeconomic setting is then extended in three different directions. First, consistent
with Kaldorian facts, we analyze a context were the wage is allowed to grow at an exogenous
fixed rate. Second, since inflation has been considered by many economists one of the leading
causes of the disappearance of the rich bourgeoisie, we consider the effects on the LRD of
episodes of inflation. Third, we study the effects of negative and positive shocks that concern
wealth directly. Wars and epidemics are examples of negative shocks. The emergence of a
lottery winner or sport superstar within a family lineage corresponds to positive shocks.
The incorporation of such exogenous shocks allows our model to account for “luck” as a
determinant of the wealth accumulation process and transmission.
Both the analysis of the basic model and of the different extensions point to the crucial
role of the willingness to exert effort and the hunger for accumulation, rather than of initial
wealth or transitory shocks to wealth or inflation, in generating the patterns of wealth
accumulation within a family lineage. Interestingly, the accumulation of wealth may be
slowed down by the the existence of a member of the dynasty who builds an extremely
big patrimony, and the presence of positive shocks is another way our model can generate
predictions that are consistent with the famous “Shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves” adage.
Lastly and more importantly, we introduce two frameworks with heterogenous dynasties
to use our microfounded model to explain some macroeconomic issues such as the disappear-
ance of the rich bourgeoisie, the existence of dilapidators, the evolution of wealth inequalities,
social mobility and class structure.
First, considering a context with two types of dynasties differing with respect to their
hunger for accumulation, we show that our model provides a simple deterministic alternative
to the sophisticated model of Matsuyama (2006) for the endogenous emergence of a stratified
society, wherein inherently (almost) identical agents may endogenously separate into the rich
and the poor. While there are cases where wealth inequalities can indefinitely increase in
the long run, we identify situations where even without government intervention inequalities
are temporarily reduced.
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Finally, using a setting with fully heterogenous dynasties, we show that our model pro-
vides a possible interpretation for the demise of the rich bourgeoisie and the end of a class
struggle which is consistent with the recent explanations of Galor and Moav (2006) and
of Doepke and Zilibotti (2005 and 2008) rather than with those based on capital markets
imperfections.6 According to our model the high wages during the 20th century might have
caused the switch from a two-class very unequal society to a three-class society where inher-
ited wealth is always positive and the difference between the rich and the other classes are
reduced. Social mobility is higher, as even dynasties with zero or little wealth can, depending
on their hunger for accumulation, in the long-run belong to any social class. Similarly, in
the medium-run it is likely to observe new capitalists emerging from the middle and lower
classes. Therefore, differently from models with capital market imperfections, our model
predicts that those who take the effort to innovate and take advantage of new profitable
opportunities are agents who are neither too poor nor too rich.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 is devoted to
the characterization of the possible types of long-run dynamics. Section 4 studies three ex-
tensions of the model to take account of Kaldorian facts, episodes of inflation, and exogenous
temporary shocks to wealth. Section 5 introduces heterogeneity across altruistic dynasties
to study the implications of our model with respect to the formation and dissolution of a
stratified society and the demise of the rich bourgeoisie. Finally, Section 6 concludes. All
proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider one dynasty composed of successive generations of agents, each living one period
and giving birth to a child. The problem faced by an agent, member of this dynasty, is the
same in each period: given initial wealth, he has to decide whether to work, how much to
consume, and how much to leave as end-of-period wealth.
Formally, we let t = 0, ...,∞ denote the time. The agent at time t has initial (inherited)
non-negative wealth Xt = Rtxt ≥ 0, where xt ≥ 0 is
7 the wealth left by the previous
6Veneziani (2007) also analyses exploitation and class formation in a dynamic context. He proves that
differential ownership of (scarce) productive assets is an inherent feature of a capitalist economy, while
exploitation tends to disappear in the long run.
7For simplicity there is only one risk-free asset in the economy and there is no explicit capital. Since each
agent lives only one period and has to repay his debt within his lifetime, there is no active role for credit
markets.
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generation and Rt is the asset gross rate of return. We consider a binary choice variable
for effort (labor), et ∈ {0, 1}: agents can provide either minimal effort (normalized to 0), or
some fixed positive level (normalized to 1).8 When the agent exerts effort (works) he receives
an exogenous wealth (wage) wt. The agent lifetime disposable income, Ωt = wtet + Rtxt, is
allocated between consumption ct and end-of-period wealth xt+1.
2.1 - Preferences.
The preferences of an agent born in t are defined over his period consumption, ct, his end-of-
period wealth, xt+1, which will be transferred to his offspring, and his effort level, et. Such
preferences are represented by the following utility function:
U(ct, xt+1, et) = (1− β) ln ct + β ln(ε+ xt+1)− ξet (1)
where β ∈ (0, 1), ε ≥ 0 and ξ ≥ 0.
Equation (1) is quite general, as it imbeds different specifications used in the literature.
When ξ = 0 and ε = 0 we recognize the “pure joy of giving” (or “warm-glow”) approach
used by, for example, Galor and Zeira (1993) and Aghion and Bolton (1997). The case with
effort (ξ = 1 and ε = 0) is treated by Piketty (1997). When ε > 0 and ξ = 0 we recognize
the “spirit of capitalism” specification used recently by De Nardi (2004) or Galor and Moav
(2006).
Our specification of the utility derived from wealth allows us to interpret the parameter
β alternatively as a degree of dynastic altruism9 or as the hunger for dynastic accumulation.
Notice also that restricting to ε > 0 is equivalent to ruling out the condition of infinite
marginal utility of wealth at xt+1 = 0. It will be shown later that it allows having a richer
set of dynamics of wealth accumulation and these dynamics fit better the data.
As already pointed out, one of the novelties of this paper is the introduction of effort in a
“spirit of capitalism” setting. The parameter ξ represents the willingness to exert effort or, in
other words, the cost of effort. It is a key parameter in our setting, as it drives the response
8The discretization of effort (labor) e, introduced by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1985) and used by Piketty
(1997), is often used when labor income is not necessarily the only source of wealth (see, e.g., Diamond and
Mirrlees 1978 in a context of social insurance). This is also a classical tool in the principal-agent literature.
Here, e can be viewed as the effort to exert by an agent endowed (by a principal) with wealth x to obtain
an additional wealth w (rather than a pure number of worked hours). Importantly, our results are not due
to the fact that et is a discrete variable rather than a continuous one. Indeed, we show Appendix G that
Propositions 1 and 2 hold when we only assume et ≥ 0.
9Remark that a non-degenerate wealth distribution is also obtained by Dutta and Michel (1998) in a
setting with imperfect altruism and linear price.
5
of effort choice to wealth. Such response will, in turn, determine the different typologies of
dynastic wealth dynamics. While everybody would agree that such parameter is (at least
weakly) positive, its magnitude is controversial. Our theoretical model allows analyzing the
possible effects of wealth on effort and wealth transmission as a function of ξ.
2.2 - Optimal choices of effort and wealth transmission.
The following two propositions characterize the optimal choices of effort and wealth trans-
mission of an agent living in t.
Proposition 1 An agent living in t transmits to his child an increasing proportion of his
disposable income Ωt, which is independent of prices wt and Rt. In particular:
xt+1 =
{
0 if Ωt ≤ σε
βΩt − (1− β)ε if Ωt > σε
, (2)
where σ = 1/β − 1.
Proof - See Appendix A.
Proposition 1 tells us that the agent leaves a positive wealth only when lifetime income
is sufficiently high. Otherwise an agent may be captured into a poverty trap, wherein he is
so poor (inherited wealth and wage are both very low) that he consumes all of his resources
without leaving any wealth to his successor. Because in our model the propensity to save
can be defined as the ratio xt+1/ Ωt, Proposition 1 tells us that, coherent with empirical
evidence (see, e.g., Galor 2000, Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes 2004, or Galor and Moav 2006,
footnote 36), the propensity to save is zero for individuals with low lifetime income and is
increasing in lifetime income otherwise. On this dimension our microfounded formulation is
more empirically relevant than those of the standard literature on distributional dynamics
with credit-rationing, where each agent leaves an exogenous fraction of his total income to
the next generation (see, e.g., Aghion and Bolton 1997, Piketty 1997 or Matsuyama 2000).
For what concerns the effort choice, while it is obvious that when an agent inherits no
wealth he decides to work (otherwise he would have zero consumption), when inherited
wealth is positive he may decide not to work.
Proposition 2 There exists a positive threshold Xt, increasing in wt but independent of Rt,
such that an agent living in t decides not to exert effort if and only if his inherited wealth
Xt = Rtxt is greater than Xt. Hence:
et =
{
1 if Xt ≤ Xt
0 if Xt > Xt
.
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Figure 1: Optimal decisions as a function of the wage and inherited wealth.
Proof - See Appendix B.
Let µ1 = (1−β)
(
1− 1/eξ/(1−β)
)
/β and µ2 =
(
eξ − 1
)
/β, where µ1 < σ and µ1 < µ2. As
shown in Appendix B, there exist three thresholds X♯t , X
⋆
t and X satisfying X
♯
t ≤ σε−wt ≤
X⋆t ≤ σε ≤ Xt such that:
Xt =

X♯t if wt ≤ µ1ε
X⋆t if µ1ε < wt < µ2ε
X t if wt ≥ µ2ε
.
Figure 1 provides a very useful graphical representation of the optimal decisions about
whether to transmit a positive wealth and/or to work as a function of the wage and inherited
wealth, as implied by Propositions 1 and 2.
The dashed line Xt is increasing. It is linear for low and high wages and it is convex for
intermediate wages. Above Xt , that is in regions C and D, an agent living in t decides not
to work. The decision about wealth transmission xt+1 is determined by the line Xt = σε,
above which (region D) the agent transmits positive wealth and below which (region C) he
leaves zero wealth. Below Xt, that is in regions A and B, the agent decides to work. In these
regions the decision about xt+1 is determined by the line Xt = σε − wt. To its left (region
B) the agent leaves no wealth and to the right (region A) he leaves positive wealth.
From the above results it follows that transmitted wealth xt+1 may be non monotonic in
inherited wealth Xt. For instance for wages between µ1ε and min{µ2ε, σε}, when inherited
wealth is zero (region B), the agent leaves no bequest to his successor. As the level of initial
wealth Xt increases, eventually we reach region A, where the agent leaves positive wealth.
However, as initial wealth increases further we eventually enter into region C, where the
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agent goes back to transmitting no wealth.
It is important to notice that when ε = 0, the relevant part of Figure 1 becomes the upper
right region (σε collapses to zero), where only regions A and D exist. That is, in presence of
pure joy of giving agents always leave a positive wealth to the successive generation. Such a
simpler formulation although more tractable does not take into consideration the empirical
evidence about the existence of a large proportion of (poor) agents who do not leave positive
bequests because their lifetime income is barely enough to finance their own consumption.
Finally, remark that our results are not due to the fact that et is a discrete variable rather
than a continuous one. Indeed, we show Appendix G that Propositions 1 and 2 hold when
we only assume et ≥ 0.
3 Dynamics of dynastic wealth
In this section we characterize the full dynamics of wealth from generation to generation
within a dynasty. As common in the closely related literature, for simplicity we assume that
Rt and wt are constant through time.
10 A straightforward application of Propositions 1 and
2 leads to the following dynamic equation of wealth.
Proposition 3 The evolution of dynastic wealth is given by the following dynamic equation:
Xt+1 =

0 if Xt ≤ σε− w or X
∗ < Xt ≤ σε
βR[w +Xt − σε] if σε− w < Xt ≤ X
∗ or σε < Xt ≤ X
βR[Xt − σε] if Xt > X
. (3)
The dynamic equation of dynastic wealth is determined by three branches. In the first
branch wealth is equal to zero. In the other two branches the evolution of wealth is defined by
an arithmetic-geometric progression which depends on whether the agent is exerting effort.
Proposition 3 provides a compact description of the evolution of wealth. The reader can find
its complete characterization as a function of wage in Appendix C.
3.1 - Typologies and properties of long-run dynamics.
Since our model is deterministic, for any given initial wealth X0 we can trace all the sequence,
X1, X2, ... of dynastic wealth. Although initial wealth X0 might affect the behavior of the
first generations, we can find some regularities in the behavior of future generations starting
10As Galor and Zeira (1993) we relax in Section 4.1 the standard assumption of constant wages and consider
the case where wages grow at a constant rate. In Section 4.2, where we consider episodes of inflation, we
implicitly study the effects of changes in R.
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from a certain period which is not necessarily too far away. We have to clarify this point
because, in general, the evolution of wealth and work behavior across members of the same
dynasty do not exhibit stationary patterns in our model. The characterization of the above
mentioned regularities, which we refer to as “long-run dynamics”, is the object of this section.
Before defining and formally characterizing the types of LRD that can emerge in our
setting, some clarifications about the terminology that we will use are in order. We break-
down the class of individuals who inherit a positive wealth and do not work into three
sub-categories. We define as: (a) rentiers those agents who do not work but nevertheless
transmit a level of wealth greater than the wealth they have inherited; (b) dilapidators those
agents who do not work and transmit a (strictly positive) level of wealth which is lower than
the one they have inherited; and (c) ruiners those agents who receive positive wealth but
neither work or leave positive wealth.
The general typologies of LRD that can be observed in a society and their properties
are summarized in Table 1. We assign to each type of LRD a composite name composed
of two parts. The first indicates the type of long-run wealth that the LRD allows reaching.
It is zero if dynastic wealth converges towards or periodically becomes zero; fini or cycl
if accumulated wealth is positive and finite, and infi if it grows unboundedly. The second
part indicates the long-run working status of the dynasty. It is work if in the long run each
member of the dynasty works, rent if in the long run no member of the dynasty works, and
mix if there exists a mix of workers and non-workers (dilapidators or rentiers). It follows
that a LRD is said to be:
• zero-work if, from a certain period, all generations work and choose not to transmit any
wealth.
• fini-work if, from a certain period, all generations work and transmitted wealth mono-
tonically converges towards a positive finite value.
• cycl-work if, from a certain period, all generations work but the finite wealth accumu-
lated does not converge towards a unique value.
• zero-mix if, from a certain period, there is periodically one generation who does not work
and completely squanders all the wealth accumulated by the preceding generations.
• fini-mix if, from a certain period, there are infinite successive runs of generations who
work and build up an upper-bounded patrimony and of generations who do not work and
squander part of their initial wealth.
• infi-mix if, from a certain period, there are infinite successive runs of generations who
work and build up a patrimony which tends to infinity and of generations who do not work
and squander part of their initial wealth.
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• infi-rent if, from a certain period, no generation works and transmitted wealth increases
monotonically towards infinity.
Type of Long-run Dynamics of Long-run existence of
LRD wealth accumulation workers dilapidators ruiners rentiers
zero-work Zero Constant Yes No No No
fini-work Finite Monotone Yes No No No
cycl-work Finite Cyclical Yes No No No
zero-mix Zero/Finite Cyclical Yes Possible Yes No
fini-mix Finite Cyclical Yes Yes No No
infi-mix Infinite Cyclical Yes Yes No No
infi-rent Infinite Monotone No No No Yes
Table 1: Typologies and properties of long-run dynamics (LRD).
In a zero-work LRD, the dynasty is caught into a poverty trap, where in the long-
run all generations work and consume all of their wage without transmitting any wealth.
In a fini-work or cycl-work LRD all generations work but wealth from generation to
generation either converges monotonically to a positive finite value X˜ (in the case of a
fini-work LRD) or has different finite accumulation modes (in the case of an cycl-work
LRD). An interesting feature of the mix types of LRD is that wealth fluctuates. In a zero-
mix LRD the cycles are regular and there exists periodically one generation, the ruiner,
who completely squanders all the wealth. This ruiner could appear after a sequence of
generations who cumulated (an increasing) positive wealth or could appear after a sequence
of dilapidators. Both in the fini-mix and the infi-mix LRD the cycles need not to be
regular and wealth is always bounded away from zero, implying the existence of dilapidators
but the absence of ruiners.
Notice that our setting can generate different degrees of inter-generational mobility. This
is characterized by the changes in the working and wealth accumulation behaviors among
members of the same dynasty in correspondence to the different LRD. In 4 out of 7 LRD
the status of the members of a dynasty is invariant. However, mobility exists in all the three
LRD of type mix.
3.2 - Characterizations of the long-run dynamics.
The determination of the LRD of a dynasty hinges on the analysis of the non-trivial branches
of the dynamic equation (3). For instance, it is important to notice that when the wage is
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sufficiently appealing (i.e., w > σε), the wealth accumulated by an infinite sequence of
workers tends towards infinity if βR > 1 and towards X˜ = βR[w − σε]/(1− βR) if βR < 1.
When βR < 1, an agent deciding not to work always transmits a level of wealth which is
lower than the one he had inherited. It is this type of decumulation of wealth that gives rise
to a succession of generations who decide not to work and dilapidate part or the integrality
of a given inheritance. Conversely, when βR > 1, an agent deciding not to work transmits a
level of wealth greater than the one he had inherited if and only if the latter is greater than
X̂ = βRσε/(βR − 1). It is this type of wealth accumulation that makes the emergence of
rentiers possible.
Using these results, we now characterize the types of LRD generated by our model. We
distinguish such characterization according to the relative values of the interest rate and
the hunger for accumulation, i.e. βR < 1 or βR > 1. Table 2 summarizes our results (see
Propositions 4 and 5 in Appendix D). Notice that the basic model generates only five of the
seven LRD showed in Table 1. The LRD of type cycl-work and infi-mix will emerge
from the extensions of the model considered in the next sections. The LRD in Table 2 that
are underlined correspond to those not obtainable starting from X0 = 0.
βR < 1 βR > 1
w ≤ µ1ε zero-work
zero-work
infi-rent
zero-work
µ1ε < w ≤ σε zero-work fini-mix
infi-rent
fini-work fini-mix
σε < w ≤ µ2ε fini-mix zero-mix
zero-mix infi-rent
w > max{σε, µ2ε}
fini-work
fini-mix
infi-rent
fini-mix
Table 2: Characterization of the LRDs in the “spirit of capitalism” setting.
When βR < 1, the intuition behind our results is the following. When the wage is at
a subsistence level (w ≤ σε), eventually all members of the dynasty choose to work and
to not transmit any wealth. This pattern holds for any level of initial wealth. Clearly it
holds when inherited wealth is small, as the agent is forced to work and to allocate the
totality of income to consumption. Interestingly, it holds also for higher level of wealth.
In fact, when initial wealth is sufficiently high (X0 > σε), due to the low wage, the initial
generation and potentially some of the successive ones decide not to work and to finance
consumption with inherited wealth. Therefore, in a finite time the latter becomes zero and
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stays zero thereafter. This zero-work LRD entails a poverty trap and is consistent with
the empirical evidence that consumption tracks current income and that many households
do not receive an inheritance.
For higher wages (w > σε) the LRD can be of three types: fini-work, fini-mix or zero-
mix. In order for a fini-work LRD to exist, the limiting value X˜ of wealth accumulated
by an infinite sequence of workers must be no greater than the threshold X above which
individuals choose not to work. When X0 < X all generations work and wealth converges to
X˜ monotonically from below. When X0 > X the initial generations decide not to work and
decumulate wealth. However, once X˜ < Xt < X , all future generations work and wealth
monotonically decreases towards X˜.
The LRD is of type mix whenever X˜ is greater than X . This is because, once there is a
member of the dynasty who does not work (there is always some when X˜ > X ), transmitted
wealth becomes lower than inherited wealth. Wealth decreases through time until it becomes
too low for the following generation to decide not to work. Of the two types of mix LRD a
zero-mix could exist only when σε < w < µ2ε. In fact the wage w must be greater than σε,
otherwise we would have a zero-work LRD, and lower than µ2ε, otherwise transmitted
wealth could never become zero. A fini-mix LRD exists only if once wealth becomes positive
it never goes back to zero. This is clearly the case when w > max{σε, µ2ε} and it could
happen also when σε < w < µ2ε.
Different from the previous case, the types of LRD obtained when βR > 1 always depend
on the level of initial wealth, X0. When the wage is relatively low (w ≤ µ1ε) a zero-work
LRD emerges for low levels of inherited wealth. This is because, although for each dollar
bequeathed the next generation receives more than 1 dollar, the level of wealth is too low
to consider leaving a big portion of it to the next generation. Transmitted wealth decreases
over time and eventually becomes zero. Conversely, an infi-rent LRD is obtained for
high levels of inherited wealth. All members of the dynasty will choose not to work and
nevertheless, because of the high interest rate and/or hunger for accumulation, will leave
increasing bequests. When µ1ε < w ≤ σε, in addition to the zero-work and to the infi-
rent LRD it is also possible to have a fini-mix LRD. When w > max{σε, µ2ε} we find the
same type of mix LRD as with βR < 1. In addition, while with βR < 1 it was only possible
to have a fini-work LRD, with βR > 1 it is only possible to have infi-rent LRD.
At this point we have a wider understanding of the role played by the parameter ε. Our
formulation, when ε > 0, generates five possible typologies of wealth dynamics. Conversely,
pure joy of giving, where X̂ = 0 and ε = 0, delivers only three of them, which are summarized
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in Table 3.
βR < 1 βR > 1
w > 0
fini-work
fini-mix
infi-rent
Table 3: Characterization of the LRDs in the “pure joy of giving” setting.
To summarize, in our framework, contrary to joy of giving, spirit of capitalism allows
generating zero-work LRD (i.e., the numerous households with near zero wealth) and
zero-mix LRD (i.e., in line with the “Shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves in three generations” adage).
A graphical representation of the results of this section makes the study of the role of
prices (i.e., w and R) and of the effort parameter (i.e., ξ) easier and will be at the basis of the
comparative static results implicit in the analysis of the next sections. It also allows pointing
out the ability of our framework to explain part of the labor choices and wealth dynamics
observed in our contemporary societies. However, due to the many configurations that can
emerge in equilibrium and in order not to distract the attention of the reader from the most
relevant results, such a graphical treatment (Figures 4 to 8) and its tedious derivation are
provided in Appendix E.
4 Extensions
The analysis of the effort and wealth accumulation choices of Section 2 and the character-
ization of the LRD of the basic model of Section 3, allows determining, which conditions
guarantee the emergence and the persistence or disappearance of rentiers within a family
lineage. The understanding of such conditions is a pre-requisite for the study of some macro
issues related to the distribution of wealth. We reserve such analysis to Section 5, where we
study contexts with heterogenous dynasties. In this section we consider some extensions of
the basic model and their implications for the emergence, the persistence or disappearance
of rentiers within a family lineage and more in general for the LRD within a dynasty.
Our analysis so far has assumed, as most theoretical models studying the dynamics of
wealth accumulation and distribution, that both wages and interest rates are constant over
time. We start by relaxing this assumption. In fact, according to Kaldor (1957), who
summarizes into stylized facts a number of empirical regularities in the growth process in
industrialized countries, the (real) rate of return on investment R is roughly constant over
long periods of time while the real wage w grows at a positive constant rate over time. To
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verify the robustness of our results to this fact, we consider in subsection 4.1 the case where
wages grow at a constant rate.
After 1957, year of the influential article by Kaldor, strong inflation waves have hit many
countries, such as, for example, the US, UK and France, contradicting the Kaldor argument
that real interest rates are roughly constant. As a second extension we therefore consider, in
subsection 4.2, the impact of inflation on the behavior of the members of a dynasty as well
as on wealth accumulation.
In our model, from the perspective of a member of a dynasty, inflation is nothing but a
shock to the return on inherited wealth. We consider in subsection 4.3 positive and negative
shocks that concern wealth directly. Wars and epidemics are examples of negative shocks
to wealth that affect all dynasties. Winning a lottery or being the immediate descendent
of a sport/movie star or of a successful self-made business man are examples of positive id-
iosyncratic shocks to wealth that hit specific dynasties. The incorporation of such exogenous
shocks allows our model to account for “luck” as a determinant of the wealth accumulation
process and transmission. Indeed, although we explicitly chose to abstract from luck we do
recognize that luck is an important determinant of the process of wealth accumulation. It
is for example a crucial determinant to explain the appearance of “self made (wo)men” and
the “reverse of fortunes”.
4.1 - Exogenous wage growth.
In this subsection we partially relax the assumption of fixed prices and assume, coherently
with Kaldorian facts, that (real) wages grow at a constant positive rate γ, i.e., wt = (1+γ)
tw0.
Under this assumption both thresholds Xt and X˜ increase over time and grow towards
infinity. As it is derived in Appendix F, we find that, there is always a period T ′ after
which the wealth accumulated by a sequence of workers is greater than both X̂ and XT ′+t.
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Moreover, since the wage wt eventually grows towards infinity, in all types of LRD wealth
must tend towards infinity as well. Consequently, for each initial positive wage (w0 > 0), its
rate of growth (γ > 0), and initial wealth (X0 ≥ 0), there are only two possible LRD: when
βR > 1 the economy grows unboundedly towards an infi-rent LRD, and when βR < 1 the
economy converges towards a infi-mix LRD. The convergence towards the infinite wealth
dynamics is monotonic in the first case but not in the second.
These results concern the long run only. However, as in the basic model, they do not
necessarily characterize the non-monotonic pattern that wealth can potentially follow in a
11The fact that wages grow over time does not affect the dynamic of wealth accumulation of a sequence
of agents who do not work, Xt+1 = βR[Xt − σε]. Therefore X̂ is independent of w.
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shorter time span. In fact, the medium-term dynamics that can emerge in the context of
exogenously growing wages can be compatible with a variety of dynastic behaviors observed
in the real world. For example, even in the case of an infi-rent LRD we can find along the
way both ruiners and dilapidators.
We conclude by two important and interesting remarks. First, since the higher the wage
the higher the incentive to work, our model predicts that, when βR < 1, wage growth
triggers the disappearance of rentiers within each dynasty. Second, if we were to consider
heterogeneous dynasties, the model would also imply the disappearance of rentiers at the
top of the wealth distribution. This is because when the wage increases so does the level
of wealth which is needed to be at the top of the distribution. Therefore, while dynasties
who choose to work accumulate bigger and bigger patrimonies, dynasties that continue to
be rentiers may no longer appear at the top of the distribution. These two implications,
captured by our model, are supported by empirical evidence pointed out by Piketty and Saez
(2006): “top income shares have increased substantially in English speaking countries but
not at all in continental Europe countries or Japan. This increase is due to an unprecedented
surge in top wage incomes starting in the 1970s and accelerating in the 1990s. As a result,
top wage earners have replaced capital income earners at the top of the income distribution
in English speaking countries.”
4.2 - Inflation.
Inflation has been considered by many economists as one of the leading causes of the
disappearance of rentiers. In fact, inflation reduces real interest rates and, as a consequence,
it slows down wealth accumulation. In the last chapter of “The General Theory”, Keynes
foresees the ultimate fall of the rate of return to capital to zero and calls this situation the
“Euthanasia of the rentier”.
To analyze the effect of inflation, we can assume that at a certain period κ a strong
inflation rate i hits the economy. Using Fisher equation, the real interest rate R can be
written as Ri = R/(1 + i). By reducing the real return on transmitted wealth, inflation
has a confiscatory effect that reduces accumulated wealth and, in turn, the possibility of
having rentiers. In fact, as a result of inflation the member of a dynasty at κ receives wealth
X iκ = R
ixκ which is lower than X
0
κ = R
0xκ, the one he would have received without inflation.
Independent of the wealth Xt−1 received by its predecessor, the higher the inflation the lower
the chances that the member in κ will behave as a rentier. In particular, when X < X0κ and
X iκ < X , inflation slows down the possible appearance of rentiers (if Xκ−1 < X ) or it makes
rentiers disappear (if Xκ−1 > X ).
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Since, in our context episodes of hyperinflation have only transitory effects, they can
explain the phenomenon of the Euthanasia of rentiers in the short and medium run only. It
follows that, when the disappearance of rentiers is due uniquely to episodes of inflation, and
these are followed by episodes of low inflation, we would expect the dynasty to rebuild its
wealth and rentiers to reappear. Our model can capture the phenomenon of the Euthanasia
of rentiers in the long run in case of persistent inflation, that is, when from a period κ the real
interest rate becomes Rt = R
i = R/(1−i). In this case, it can be shown that the confiscatory
effect of inflation is such that there always exists an inflation rate above which both inherited
wealth and the relative real interest rate become so low (βRi < 1 and X iκ < X ) that all
members of the dynasty eventually become workers (i.e., the LRD becomes either fini-work
or zero-work).12 The result that persistent episodes of hyperinflation makes the survival of
rentiers very hard is supported by empirical evidence about, for example, the disappearance
of rentiers in France during the 20th century. Indeed, according to Piketty (2003), “one must
bear in mind that inflation did act as a powerful capital tax. The French consumer price
index was multiplied by a factor of more than 100 between 1914 and 1950, which means that
bondholders were fully expropriated by inflation. The same process applied, in a less extreme
way, to real estate owners and landlords. Rent control was severe during both world wars,
and the real value of rents was divided by 10 between 1913 and 1950. Further, the 1914-50
inflationary process was something entirely new for the economic agents of the time.”
4.3 - Luck and bad luck.
Obviously, the depletion of the fortunes of rentiers is not uniquely explained by inflation.
It could be due to other types of shocks such wars or the Great Depression.
The behavior of a dynasty reacts not only to unforeseen shocks hitting the whole economy
but also to idiosyncratic shocks within each dynasty. This is the case for example when within
a dynasty an exceptional member (a creator, successful businessman, a TV or sport star, a
lottery winner, etc.) appears whose cumulated wealth reaches abnormally high levels. The
incorporation of such exogenous transitory shocks therefore allows our model to account for
“luck”, which, as advocated by Frank Knight, is one of the three determinants of the wealth
accumulation process and transmission.
The transitory shocks in our economy can affect the four fundamental exogenous pa-
rameters of the model (i.e., w, R, ξ, β and ε) or directly inherited wealth XT at a certain
period T . Formally, a transitory shock corresponds to assuming that at a certain time T
12Since X > 0 is independent of Ri and for all finite xκ, limi→+∞X
i
κ = Rxκ/(1 + i) = 0, there exists i
⋆
and T such that for all i > i⋆ and t > T , we have X it < X .
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one parameter changes to return to its initial value at time T ′ > T . It should be noticed
that the LRD obtained after such a temporary shock is equivalent to the one obtained in
correspondence of the initial parameters and a new (initial) wealth XT ′. It follows that, in
order to understand the impact of transitory shocks it is enough to study the effect of an
unexpected change in inherited wealth.
Figure 2 illustrates a case where wealth receives a particularly big positive shock, caused,
for example, by the emergence of a self-made man (like Bill Gates). On the LHS of Figure
2 there is the situation where without the positive shock the economy would converge to a
fini-work LRD. The RHS of Figure 2 shows the situation in presence of a positive shock.
In particular, when the member of the fourth generation makes, thanks to the exogenous
positive shock, a big fortune (i.e., X4>X ) the fifth generation chooses not to work and
dilapidates part of inherited wealth. The next generation also chooses not to work and ruins
all the wealth (i.e., X6 = 0). From then on, all the following generations work and accumulate
wealth, meaning that the long-run dynamics has not been affected by the temporary shock.
However, paradoxically, the accumulation of wealth has been slowed down by the positive
shock to wealth. In fact starting from the sixth period, each member of the dynasty is richer
when he belongs to the (otherwise equal) dynasty that hasn’t received the shock than when
he belongs to the dynasty that did receive the shock.
t
Xt
X˜
0
X
t
Xt
X˜
0
X
Figure 2: An illustration of the “Shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves in three generations” adage.
This example illustrates that the presence of positive shocks is another way our model
can generate predictions that are consistent with the the “Shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves in three
generations” adage as well as with the more recent evidence that 6 out of 10 families loose
their fortunes by the end of the second generation and 9 out of 10 by the end of the third
(see Cochell and Zeeb, 2005).
According to our model, the existence of a member of the dynasty (a self-made man)
who builds an extremely big patrimony may not be enough to guarantee the prosperity of
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all future members of the dynasty. This is because the hunger for accumulation β and the
effort cost ξ, rather than initial wealth, are the crucial determinants of the LRD. When
βR < 1, initial wealth can only lead to a switch between a fini-mix and a zero-mix LRD.
Indeed, the LRD is independent of initial wealth except when we have a dynamic of type
mix. However, wealth still plays a very important role when βR > 1, where a sufficient
increase in wealth always allows switching from a zero-work, or a fini-mix, or a zero-
mix LRD to an infi-rent LRD. Indeed, an infi-rent LRD can emerge once the positive
shock to wealth is such that XT ′ > X̂.
The situations with negative shocks to wealth, due for example to wars, epidemics or to
reverse of fortunes, can be analyzed in the same way. Consider for example the case where
a negative shock causes the ruin of a dynasty (that is wealth suddenly becomes zero).13 In
this case, if the wage w is sufficiently high (i.e., w > σε) the LRD remains infi-rent. The
wealth depletion only makes the short-term wealth accumulation process to restart from zero
but it does affects its long run dynamics.
To summarize, we have shown in subsections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 that wage growth, episodes
of inflation, and other shocks all provide a possible explanation for the erosion of fortunes
and disappearance of rentiers in the short and medium term. However, our analysis suggests
that by and large episodes of inflation or other shocks do not affect the long-run wealth ac-
cumulation process but only the speed of convergence towards its LRD. Therefore, although
these factors explain the disappearance of rentiers, in the absence of other “shocks” they do
not provide an explanation for its persistence.
We will show in the next sections that our model can also account for the persistent
disappearance of rentiers once we extend the basic model to consider an economy populated
by heterogenous dynasties.
5 Class structure and the demise of the rich bourgeoisie
In this section we introduce heterogeneous dynasties to use our micro-founded model to study
more in detail some macro issues related to the distribution of wealth and in particular at its
top quantiles. Namely, we will focus on the endogenous emergence or dissolution of a class
society and the demise of the rich bourgeoisie, and the evolution of wealth inequalities.
We show in subsection 5.1. that our model provides a simple deterministic alternative to
13This sudden depletion of wealth can also be the consequence of a positive shock leading the following
generation to deplate their wealth (see the example described in Figure 2).
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the sophisticated model of Matsuyama (2006) for the endogenous emergence of a stratified
society, wherein inherently identical agents may endogenously separate into the rich and the
poor. In subsection 5.2 we use our model to provide a possible interpretation for the demise
of the rich bourgeoisie and the end of a class struggle, which is consistent with the recent
explanations by Galor and Moav (2006) and Doepke and Zilibotti (2005 and 2008) rather
than with those based on capital markets imperfections.
5.1 - Endogenous class society.
In our model the social class attained by a dynasty (characterized by the long-run working
behavior and pattern of wealth) depends in big part on the hunger for accumulation. We
study the role of the parameter β on the possibility of social stratification and on the evolution
of inequality. Obviously, dynasties can be heterogeneous with respect to other characteristics.
As long as heterogeneity concerns the effort cost ξ and/or the wage w, the results derived in
Appendix E and summarized in Figures 4-8 can be directly used to infer the type of social
stratification that can emerge.
We consider two dynasties, indexed by a and b, with zero initial wealth and different
hunger for accumulation, βa > βb. We focus only on relatively high wages, that is w >
max{σε, µ2ε, (R−1)ε}. Since both dynasties start with zero initial wealth, the first member
of each dynasty works. However, in the long run the working behavior of the two dynasties
may differ, depending on their hunger for accumulation relative to the two thresholds β1 and
β2, where β1 = [Rε + X ]/[R(w + ε + X)] < 1/R corresponds
14 to the solution of X = X˜
and β2 ≥ 1/R corresponds to the minimum β such that starting from X0 = 0 it is possible
to converge to an infi-rent LRD.
Hunger βb and βa (βb < βa) LRD of Dynasty b / Dynasty a
βb < βa < β1 fini-work / fini-work
βb < β1 < βa < β2 fini-work / fini-mix
βb < β1 < β2 < βa fini-work / infi-rent
β1 < βb < βa < β2 fini-mix / fini-mix
β1 < βb < β2 < βa fini-mix / infi-rent
β2 < βb < βa infi-rent / infi-rent
Table 4: Endogenous social stratification.
Table 4 summarizes the social class reached by each of the two dynasties in the long
run for any possible value of their hunger for accumulation. First, notice that whenever the
14The assumption that w > (R − 1)ε guarantees that β1 < 1/R.
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hunger for accumulation is greater than β1, some or all members of a dynasty will not belong
to the working class (as it is instead the case in a fini-work LRD). Table 4 also shows that
in three out of six configurations there is an endogenous emergence of social stratification. In
fact, although both dynasties start with the same initial wealth and wage opportunities, due
to a different hunger for accumulation they end up in different social classes. The striking
result is that such endogenous stratification is possible even when the two dynasties are
almost identical (i.e., the differences in their hunger for accumulation is infinitesimal).15
We now turn the attention to the evolution of wealth inequality between the two dynas-
ties. Since the wealth accumulated by the first dynasty a is higher than the one accumulated
by the first generation of dynasty b, wealth inequality always emerges in the short run. If
none of the dynasties ever exits the working-class, in the long run wealth inequality increases
towards the finite value X˜a − X˜b. However, when at least one of the two dynasties has an
infi-rent LRD, inequality can indefinitely increase in the long run.
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Figure 3: Dynamics of dynastic wealth when ε = 1, ξ = 1, w = 8 and R = 2.
Interestingly there exist configurations where, even without the intervention of the gov-
ernment, inequalities are temporarily reduced. This can be the case when the LRD of dynasty
a (with the greatest hunger for accumulation) is of type fini-mix and the dilapidators of
dynasty a appear during a period where the members of dynasty b work and accumulate
wealth. This case is depicted in Figure 3, for values of parameters ε = 1, ξ = 1, w = 8 and
R = 2.
5.2 - The demise of the rich bourgeoisie.
We now use our framework to explain the existence and the demise of the 19th century’s
European class structure: the rich bourgeoisie and the poor proletariat. To this purpose, let
15Considering ǫ ∼ 0, this is the case if βa = β1−ǫ/2 and βb = β1+ǫ/2 or if βa = β2−ǫ/2 and βb = β2+ǫ/2.
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us consider an economy with a continuum of dynasties, heterogeneous with respect to initial
wealth X0, effort cost ξ, and hunger for accumulation β.
A possible explanation for the existence of a capitalist-workers class structure before the
industrial revolution could be the prevalence of very low “subsistence” wages. In this case,
corresponding in our model to w < µ1ε, society is inevitably divided into two classes (see
Table 2): the poor workers and the rich rentiers (or capitalists) with a zero-work and an
infi-rent LRD, respectively. The first class includes agents with low initial wealth (i.e.,
X0 < X̂) and those with low hunger for accumulation (i.e., β < 1/R). The second class
includes agents who have both a sufficiently high hunger for accumulation and high initial
endowment (i.e., β > 1/R and X0 > X̂). In this society class mobility is non-existent, as the
two possible LRD depend on initial wealth and in a zero-work LRD wealth never grows,
and wealth inequalities exacerbate over time.
According to our model, the presence of relatively high wages during the 20th century
could explain why a capitalist-worker class structure did not survive. It is consistent with
the theory of Galor and Moav (2006) for which during the 20th century we assisted to
a wage increase because “The capitalists found it beneficial to support universal publicly
financed education, which enhanced the participation of the working class in the process of
human and physical capital accumulation, and led to a widening of the middle class and to
the eventual demise of the capitalists-workers class structure”. While wage is exogenous in
our model, it delivers implications coherent with this theory. In fact when wages are high
w > max{σε, µ2ε}, in our economy there are three social classes (see Table 2) characterized
by dynasties with fini-work, fini-mix, and infi-rent LRD. In this new society agents
are richer, as not only the wage is higher but inherited wealth is always positive in the long
run. For the same reason, economic differences between the rich rentiers and the other
social classes are reduced. Furthermore, initial endowment is less important in determining
the evolution of wealth. In fact even dynasties with zero or little initial wealth can, in the
long run and depending on their hunger for accumulation, belong to any social class. As a
consequence, in the medium run social mobility is higher and we are likely to observe new
capitalists emerging from the middle and lower classes.
Our model can therefore account for both the passage from a two-class very unequal
society to a three-class less unequal society and the decreasing importance over time of
initial wealth (and, hence, for example, of landowners) just by considering the wage increase
observed in the 20th century.
Notice that in our setting extremely wealthy agents (see Proposition 2) as well as agents
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with high cost of effort (see Figures 4-8 in Appendix E) will choose not to work (or innovate).
It follows that the prediction of our model are also consistent, under appropriate assumptions
on the correlation between wealth and the cost of effort, with Doepke and Zilibotti (2005
and 2008). According to them, the decline of the bourgeoisie is the result of the endogenous
choice of the rate of time impatience, which conducts the middle class to become patient and
more willing to engage in new costly but profitable opportunities.16 Different from models
with capital market imperfections (see, e.g., Banerjee and Newman 1993, Galor and Zeira
1993 or Matsuyama 2006), our model predicts that those who take the effort to innovate and
take advantage of new profitable opportunities are agents who are neither too poor nor too
rich.
6 Conclusions
This paper proposes a microfounded model to study the accumulation and transmission
of wealth within a dynasty. Despite being deterministic the model can generate a variety
of long-run patterns of wealth and effort choice. For instance, it can explain why some
dynasties are captured into a poverty trap, why some other dynasties present dilapidators
and ruiners who give rise to patterns of wealth as the one celebrated in the adage attributed
to Andrew Carnegie, and why some dynasties consist of rentiers, who cumulate patrimonies
that are meant to last indefinitely. For its focus on the dynamics of wealth accumulation
the paper should be considered as a contribution complementary to those studies of wealth
accumulation that consist of the calibration of stochastic growth models or of theoretical
models with human capital considerations or imperfect credit market.
Importantly, we also explained some macroeconomic features of social mobility and class
structure as well as the existence and the demise of the rich bourgeoisie using frameworks
which do not need to appeal to capital markets imperfections.17 For example, in a setting
16They focus on the puzzle of the rapid decline of the bourgeoisie: “why did the upper classes prove
unable to exploit the new opportunities arising with industrialization, in spite of their superior wealth
and education? Economic theories of wealth inequality often appeal to capital market imperfections: poor
individuals may be unable to finance otherwise profitable investment projects, and are therefore forced to
enter less productive professions. According to this theory, when new technological opportunities arise, the
rich (who are least constrained by credit market imperfections) should be the first beneficiaries. Indeed, this
theory should be highly relevant for the British Industrial Revolution, because wealth inequality was quite
extreme and financial markets shallow by modern standards. Yet, we know now that the old rich did not do
well at all, and were overtaken by a new economic elite that rose from the middle classes.”
17The interested reader can find some examples of introducing wage and inheritance taxation in our
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with fully heterogeneous dynasties our model provides an explanation for the demise of the
rich bourgeoisie that predicts that those who take the effort to innovate and take advantage
of new profitable opportunities are agents who are neither too poor nor too rich. Finally, our
model provides a simple deterministic alternative to recent sophisticated literature for the
endogenous emergence of a stratified society, wherein inherently (almost) identical agents
may endogenously separate into the rich and the poor.
To summarize, our analysis reveals that the main factors determining the long-run dy-
namics of wealth and effort are the intensity of preferences towards wealth accumulation
and the predisposition towards working or, alternatively, the entrepreneurial attitude.18 In
most cases the interplay between these two preference parameters, rather than initial wealth,
transitive shocks to wealth, inflation, or capital market imperfections determine the long-run
process of wealth accumulation and transmission within a family lineage and the evolution
of wealth inequalities.
Obviously, our analysis is a great starting point for further empirical analysis. It would
be interesting to carefully calibrate the model and discuss the relevance and plausibility
of the chosen parameter values for specific countries or historical periods. Depending on
the period or the country of study, one may need to introduce further extensions into the
model. For instance, right now the interest rate is exogenous. But in the long run, it must
be determined endogenously together with the wage rate and the capital accumulated by a
country. Another possibility would thus be, for instance, to select a specific event or situation
(e.g. a specific country) and apply our model, with a careful discussion of the parameters,
to capture the actual behavior of the economy, highlighting which of the ingredients of our
model (spirit of capitalism, etc.) is (or is not) fundamental to understand the empirical facts.
framework in Degan and Thibault (2008). In particular, using a “savers-spenders” approach popularized
by Mankiw (2000), we show that inheritance taxation can provide an explication for the fact that the big
fortunes that have been depleted have never completely rebuilt. In addition, even in those cases where
inheritance taxation slows down the wealth accumulation process, it can lead in certain periods to a higher
transmitted wealth than in contexts without taxation and can therefore redistribute wealth and lifetime
income intergenerationally. We also show that, in a context with heterogeneous dynasties, the effect of
a simple form of redistributive labor income tax strictly depend on the behavior of the richest dynasties
without taxation, on wealth and the tax rate. Then, we illustrate a situation where the labor income tax
can lead to a cycl-work LRD for the poorest dynasties.
18Mookherjee and Napel (2007) also argue that when occupational mobility is sought to be explained
by heterogeneity of talent (or investment cost, or ex post income uncertainty), long run macroeconomic
outcomes become less history dependent.
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Appendix
Appendix A – Proof of Proposition 1.
An agent chooses et and xt+1 in order to maximize (1) subject to the budget constraint
Ωt = wtet + Rtxt. Therefore, given xt, an agent maximizes: φ(xt+1, et) = (1 − β) ln
[
wtet +
Rtxt − xt+1
]
+ β ln
[
ε + xt+1
]
− ξet. It follows that the desired bequests xˇt+1 satisfies:
φ′x(xˇt+1, et) = −(1 − β)/(Ωt − xˇt+1) + β/(ε + xˇt+1) = 0. Hence: xˇt+1 = βΩt − (1 − β)ε.
Taking into account the non-negativity bequest constraint xt+1 = max{xˇt+1, 0} we obtain
(2). 
Appendix B – Proof of Proposition 2.
According to Proposition 1, we have:
xt+1 =

0 if (Xt ≤ σε and et = 0) or (wt +Xt ≤ σε and et = 1)
β[wt +Xt − σε] if (wt +Xt > σε and et = 1)
β[Xt − σε] if (Xt > σε and et = 0)
.
When Xt < σε−wt, the end-of-period wealth xt+1 is zero independent of the effort choice.
In order to choose effort then the agent compares the utility he derives when he does not work
φ(0, 0) with the utility he derives when he works φ(0, 1). Since φ(0, 0) = (1−β) lnXt+β ln ε
and φ(0, 1) = (1 − β) ln(wt +Xt) + β ln ε − ξ, we have that φ(0, 0) > φ(0, 1) if and only if
ξ > (1− β) ln(1 + wt/Xt). Then, when Xt < σε− wt, et = 0 if and only if Xt > wt/(e˜− 1),
where e˜ = eξ/(1−β). Taking into consideration that wt/(e˜ − 1) ≤ σε − wt if and only if
wt ≤ µ1ε, where µ1 = σ(1− 1/e˜), it follows that when Xt < σε− wt, et = 0 if and only if:
Xt > X
♯
t =
{
wt/(e˜− 1) if wt < µ1ε
σε− wt if wt ≥ µ1ε
.
When Xt > σε, the end-of-period wealth xt+1 is positive independent of the effort choice.
Similarly to the above case, in order to choose effort the agent compares the utility he
derives when he does not work φ(x+, 0) with the one he derives when he works φ(x+, 1).
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Since φ(x+, 0) = (1− β) ln[(1− β)(Xt + ε)] + β ln[β(Xt + ε)] and φ(x+, 1) = (1− β) ln[(1−
β)(wt +Xt + ε)] + β ln[β(wt +Xt + ε)] − ξ, we have that φ(x+, 0) > φ(x+, 1) if and only if
ξ > ln[1 + wt/(Xt + ε)]. Then, when Xt > σε, et = 0 if and only if Xt > wt/(e
ξ − 1) − ε.
Since wt/(e
ξ − 1) − ε > σε if and only if w > µ2ε, where µ2 = (e
ξ − 1)/β, it follows that
when Xt > σε, et = 0 if and only if:
Xt > X t =
{
σε if wt ≤ µ2ε
wt/(e
ξ − 1)− ε if wt > µ2ε
.
When σε − wt < Xt ≤ σε, the agent chooses between working and leaving a positive
bequest and neither working nor leaving any bequest. His optimal choice then depends on
the comparison between φ(x+, 1) and φ(0, 0). We have that φ(0, 0) > φ(x+, 1) if and only if
ξ > (1−β) ln[(1−β)(wt+Xt+ε)/Xt]+β ln[β(wt+Xt+ε)/ε]. Then, when σε−wt < Xt ≤ σε,
et = 0 if and only if A = ε
βeξ/[ββ(1− β)1−β] > ϕ(Xt) = (wt +Xt + ε)/X
1−β
t .
Since ϕ′(Xt) has the same sign as Xt − σ(wt + ε), ϕ(.) is decreasing on the interval
(σε − wt, σε]. Therefore, on this same interval, ϕ(.) reaches its maximum at ϕ(σε − wt) =
ε/[β(σε − wt)
1−β] and its minimum at ϕ(σε) = (βwt + ε)/[β
β[(1 − β)ε]1−β]. It follows that
A > ϕ(σε−wt) if and only if wt < µ1ε and A < ϕ(σε) if and only if wt > µ2ε. Consequently,
when σε− wt < Xt ≤ σε, et = 0 if and only if:
Xt > X
⋆
t =

σε− wt if wt ≤ µ1ε
Root of [A− ϕ(Xt)] if µ1ε < wt < µ2ε
σε if wt ≥ µ2ε
.
According to the previous thresholds, et = 0 if and only if: X
♯
t < Xt ≤ σε − wt,
σε − wt ≤ X
⋆
t ≤ Xt < σε, and σε ≤ X t < Xt. When w < µ1ε we have that X
♯
t < σε − wt,
X⋆t = σε−w, and X t = σε. Therefore, et = 0 if and only if Xt > X
♯
t . When µ1ε < w < µ2ε
we have that X♯t = σε − wt, σε − w < X
⋆
t < σε and X t = σε. Then, et = 0 if and only if
Xt > X
⋆
t . When w > µ2ε we have that X
♯
t = σε− wt, X
⋆
t = σε and X t > σε. Then, et = 0
if and only if Xt > X t. It follows that et = 0 if and only if Xt is larger than the threshold
Xt defined by:
Xt =

X♯t = wt/(e
ξ/(1−β) − 1) if wt ≤ µ1ε
X⋆t = Root of
{
εβeξ/[ββ(1− β)1−β]− (wt +Xt + ε)/X
1−β
t
}
if µ1ε < wt < µ2ε
X t = wt/(e
ξ − 1)− ε if wt ≥ µ2ε
,
where it should be noticed that X♯t ≤ σε− wt < X
⋆
t < σε ≤ Xt. 
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Appendix C – Characterization of the wealth dynamics as a function of the wage.
According to Propositions 1 and 2 we can distinguish the five following dynamics of wealth
accumulation:
(a) If w < µ1ε then Xt+1 =
 0 if Xt ≤ σεβR[Xt − σε] if Xt > σε
(b) If µ1ε < w < min(σε, µ2ε) then Xt+1 =

0 if Xt ≤ σε− w or X
⋆ < Xt ≤ σε
βR
[
w +Xt − σε
]
if σε− w ≤ Xt ≤ X
⋆
βR
[
Xt − σε
]
if Xt > σε
(c) If µ2ε < w < σε then Xt+1 =

0 if Xt ≤ σε− w
βR
[
w +Xt − σε
]
if σε− w ≤ Xt ≤ X
βR
[
Xt − σε
]
if Xt > X
(d) If σε < w < µ2ε then Xt+1 =

0 if X⋆ < Xt ≤ σε
βR
[
w +Xt − σε
]
if 0 ≤ Xt ≤ X
⋆
βR
[
Xt − σε
]
if Xt > σε
(e) If w > max(σε, µ2ε) then Xt+1 =
 βR
[
w +Xt − σε
]
if 0 ≤ Xt ≤ X
βR
[
Xt − σε
]
if Xt > X

Appendix D – Characterization of the long run dynamics.
In order to characterize the types of LRD of our economy, we establish some property
of the non trivial branches of the dynamic equation (3). In particular, after some easy but
tedious calculations, we characterize in the following Lemma, the form of the k-th element,
monotonicity, and convergence for each of the two branches. Let X˜ = βR[w− σε]/(1− βR)
and X̂ = βRσε/(βR− 1):
Lemma 1
A – Let XT ,..., XT+k be a sequence such that for t ∈ {0, k}, XT+t+1 = βR
[
w+XT+t− σε
]
.
a) For all t ∈ {0, k}, XT+t ≡ ΦXT (t) = (βR)
t[XT − X˜] + X˜.
b) ΦXT (t + 1) − ΦXT (t) has the sign of (XT − X˜)(βR − 1). Then, when w ≥ σε, ΦXT (t +
1) − ΦXT (t) is positive if βR > 1 and has the sign of X˜ − XT if βR < 1. When w < σε,
ΦXT (t + 1)− ΦXT (t) is negative if βR < 1 and has the sign of XT − X˜ if βR > 1.
c) lim
t→+∞
ΦXT (t) = X˜ if βR < 1, −∞ if (βR > 1 and XT < X˜) and +∞ if (βR > 1 and XT > X˜).
B – Let XT ,..., XT+k be a sequence such that for t ∈ {0, k}, XT+t+1 = βR
[
XT+t − σε
]
.
d) For all t ∈ {0, k}, XT+t ≡ ΨXT (t) = (βR)
t(XT − X̂) + X̂.
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e) ΨXT (t+ 1)−ΨXT (t) is negative if βR < 1 and has the sign of XT − X̂ if βR > 1.
f) lim
t→+∞
ΨXT (t) = X̂ < 0 if βR < 1, −∞ if (βR > 1 and XT < X̂) and +∞ if (βR > 1 and
XT > X̂).
One last element to introduce before characterizing the LRD of our economy is ∆X0(t),
which denotes the complete trajectory of wealth, starting from X0, when wealth follows:
Xt+1 =
{
βR[Xt + w − σε] if 0 ≤ Xt < X
βR[Xt − σε] Xt > X
• A necessary and sufficient condition (hereafter, nsc) to obtain a zero-work LRD is
that: (i) ∀t such that Xt = 0 we have Xt+1 = 0 and (ii) there exists a period T such that
XT = 0. According to App. C, (i) is satisfied if and only if w < σε. Then, a nsc to obtain a
zero-work LRD is that w < σε and (ii). When w < σ, according to App. C and Lemma
1, (ii) is satisfied ∀X0 if βR < 1.
• To obtain a fini-work LRD it is necessary that lim
t→+∞
ΦXT (t) = X˜ > 0, i.e., that
βR < 1 and X˜ > 0. Using Lemma 1, this is equivalent to requiring βR < 1 and w ≥ σε.
Another necessary condition is that X˜ ≤ X . To see why this is the case, suppose the opposite
was true, i.e. X < X˜. Since βR < 1, independent of X0, there would exist a period in which
wealth will be greater than X . But then, the agents will choose to stop working, which
(under βR < 1) would prevent wealth to converge towards X˜. It follows that necessary
conditions to obtain a fini-work LRD are: βR < 1, w ≥ σε, and X˜ ≤ X . According to
dynamics (d) and (e) of App. C, these necessary conditions are also sufficient.
• A nsc to obtain an infi-rent LRD is that βR > 1 and there exists a T such that
XT > X̂. According to Lemma 1, these conditions are sufficient because they guarantee
the existence of a T ′ ≥ T such that lim
t→+∞
XT ′+t = +∞. They are also necessary. Indeed, if
βR < 1 lim
t→+∞
Xt is finite. If βR < 1 and ∄ T such that XT > X̂, then lim
t→+∞
Xt = −∞.
• An obvious necessary condition to obtain a zero-mix LRD is the existence of a T such
that XT = 0. It is also necessary that when XT = 0: (i) XT+1 > 0 and (ii) there exists an
m such that XT+m = 0. According to App. C, (i) implies w ≥ σε and (ii) implies w < µ2ε.
It follows that to have a zero-mix LRD, it is necessary to be in the case (d) of App. C.
In such a setting, a nsc to have a zero-mix LRD is that wealth eventually becomes zero
both starting from XT = 0 and from X0. That is, there must exist t and t
′ such that ∆X0(t)
and ∆0(t
′) ∈ (X⋆, σε). We can find more specific conditions for the case with βR < 1. In
fact, when X˜ < X⋆ it is impossible for a t such that ∆0(t) ∈ (X
⋆, σε) to exist. Conversely,
according to Lemma 1, some t and t′ such that ∆X0(t) and ∆0(t
′) ∈ (X⋆, σε) always exist
when X⋆ < X˜ < σε.
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• Since our model is deterministic, there exists a unique LRD for any given dynasty. If the
long run accumulation is monotonic, wealth accumulated can only: be zero (and necessarily
we have a zero-work LRD); converge to a finite value (and necessarily we have a fini-
work LRD); or grow towards infinite (and necessarily we have a infi-rent LRD). Among
the LRD with non monotonic long-run accumulation, only two cases can arise, depending on
whether accumulated wealth can be zero or not. The first one corresponds to a zero-mix
LRD whereas the second one corresponds to a fini-mix LRD. Then, a nsc to obtain a fini-
mix LRD it that the necessary and sufficient conditions to obtain zero-work, fini-work,
inf-rent and zero-mix LRD are not satisfied.
Then, according to βR < 1 or βR > 1 we obtain:
Proposition 4 – When βR < 1 the LRD is:
• zero-work if and only if w ≤ σε.
• fini-work if and only if
[
σε < w < µ2ε and X˜ < X
⋆
]
or
[
w ≥ max{σε, µ2ε} and X˜ < X
]
.
• zero-mix if and only if
[
σε < w < µ2ε and X
⋆ < X˜ < σε
]
or
[
σε < w < µ2ε, σε < X˜ and
∃ t, t′ such that ∆X0(t) and ∆0(t
′)∈(X⋆, σε)].
• fini-mix if and only if
[
σε < w < µ2ε, σε < X˜ and ∀t > 0 ∆X0(t) or ∆0(t) ∈ (0, X
⋆) ∪ (σε,+∞)
]
or
[
w ≥ max{σε, µ2ε} and X < X˜
]
.
Proposition 5 – When βR > 1 the LRD is:
• zero-work if and only if w ≤ σε and there exists a period T such that XT = 0.
• zero-mix if and only if [σε < w < µ2ε and ∃ t , t
′
such that ∆X0(t) and ∆X0(t
′)∈(X⋆, σε)].
• fini-mix if and only if
[
µ1ε < w < min{σε, µ2ε} and ∀t ≥ 0 ∆X0(t) ∈ (max{σε− w, X˜}, X
⋆)
∪(σε, X̂)
]
or
[
µ2ε < w < σε and ∀t ≥ 0 ∆X0(t) ∈ (max{σε− w, X˜}, X̂)
]
or [σε < w < µ2ε
and ∀t ≥ 0, ∆X0(t) ∈ (0, X
⋆) ∪ (σε, X̂)
]
or
[
w ≥ max{σε, µ2ε} and ∀t ≥ 0∆X0(t) ≤ X̂
]
.
• infi-rent if and only if there exists a period T such that XT > X̂. 
Appendix E – Prices and long run dynamics.
In this Appendix we provide a graphical representation of the results of Propositions 4
and 5 in order to study the role of prices (w and R) and of the effort parameter ξ on the
long run dynamics.19
E.1 - Effort cost, wage opportunity and Long Run Dynamics.
We start with the analysis of the type of LRD obtained as a function of the effort cost ξ
of the members of the dynasty and the wage w prevailing in the economy. Throughout this
19A derivation of the graphical illustrations is available in the web version of Degan and Thibault (2008).
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section we focus on the case where the wage w is greater than σε.20 We distinguish three
cases according to the value of βR.
Consider first the situation, depicted in Figure 4, where βR < 1. For low effort costs,
independent of the wage, in the long run all generations work and transmit increasingly
positive levels of wealth. Conversely for high effort costs, when the wage is low all generations
are forced to work but, when the wage is high there are some generations who decide to stop
working and to live with their inheritance. It is important to remark that what drives
some of these (high wage) dynasties not to work is not a wealth effect. It is the fact that
while the threshold X above which an agent decides not to work is decreasing in ξ, the
limiting value of wealth X˜ that can be accumulated by a dynasty of workers is independent
of it. Therefore, while dynasties with low ξ work and can allow dynastic wealth to converge
towards X˜, dynasties with high ξ stop working before their wealth can approach X˜ and
(fully or partially) dilapidate their wealth.
w
ξ
fini−work
zero−mix
fini−mix
zero−mix
or
fini−mix
σε
Figure 4: Case where βR < 1.
For given effort cost ξ, an increase in wage leads at the same time to an increase in
the threshold X and in the limiting wealth X˜. However, it can be shown that X˜ increases
faster than X , making the existence of dilapidators and/or ruiners (i.e., the possibility that
X < X˜) more plausible. Hence, an increase in wage allows going from a dynamics of type
fini-work to a dynamics of type mix. In addition, among these mix dynamics, there exist
a (unique) wage below which the LRD is zero-mix and above which it is fini-mix.
20This case is not restrictive. In fact when βR < 1 and w < σε, we have a zero-work LRD. This is also
the case when βR > 1 and (w < µ1ε) or (X0 = 0 and µ1 < w < σε). Considering only w > σε avoids dealing
with the possibility of a fini-mix and infi-rent LRD when µ1ε < w < σε. Cases that can emerge only for
βR > 1 and some ranges of strictly positive X0. Although the study of these cases is possible (and available
from the authors upon request) it is extremely tedious and non-informative and is therefore omitted.
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Figure 5: Cases where βR > 1.
Consider now βR > 1. We illustrate in Figure 5 the case where 1 < βR < 2 (LHS)
and βR > 2 (RHS), respectively, where it is assumed that X0 < X̂.
21 As the cost of effort
increases there is a possibility (when the wage is not too high, depending on initial wealth
X0) to fall into a LRD with ruiners. Similarly, the set of effort costs in correspondence to
which we have an infi-rent LRD gets wider as the wage increases. This is because the
higher w the higher the wealth accumulated by a chain of workers. Therefore, the threshold
X̂ (independent of w) that inherited wealth has to pass in order to have an infi-rent LRD
is easier to reach. In fact, for high wages this is the only LRD, independent of ξ.
E.2 - Interest rate, wage opportunity and Long Run Dynamics.
We use Propositions 4 and 5 simultaneously to consider the LRD as a function of w and
R. Since there are too many possible configurations, we focus only on the case where initial
wealth X0 is zero (or, by continuity, sufficiently low). We distinguish three cases according to
the value of ξ (represented in Figure 6, 7, and 8, respectively): low effort cost, ξ < ln(2−β);
intermediate effort cost, ln(2− β) < ξ < ln[1/β]; and high effort cost, ξ > ln[1/β].22
When the wage is relatively low (i.e., w < σε), independent of the effort cost ξ the
interest rate R does not affect the type of LRD, which is of type zero-work. Consider
now wages greater than σε. When the cost of effort is low (Figure 6), the higher the wage
the higher the possibility of having agents who do not work. In particular there exist two
thresholds for the interest rate, R1 and R2 (0 < R1 < R2), such that: if R is lower than R1
the LRD is of type fini-work; if R is greater than R2 the LRD is of type infi-rent; and
when R is in between R1 and R2 the LRD is of type fini-mix.
21When βR > 1 and X0 > X̂ there is only an infi-rent LRD.
22Alternatively, in terms of the hunger for accumulation these three cases correspond to β < 2 − eξ,
2− eξ < β < e−ξ, and β > e−ξ, respectively.
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Figure 6: Case with low effort cost.
The possible switch from a fini-work to a fini-mix LRD is due, different from subsec-
tion E.1, to a wealth effect. In fact, X˜ is increasing in R but the threshold X is independent
of it. Conversely, the possible switch from a mix to an infi-rent LRD is not necessarily
due to a wealth effect, as X̂ is decreasing in R. Intuitively, because the wealth of rentiers
grows at a rate βR, the higher βR the lower the minimum initial wealth needed to obtain
at a certain period a given level of wealth.
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Figure 7: Case with intermediate cost effort.
The types of switches among LRD described above emerge also for intermediate effort
costs (Figure 7) but only when the wage is sufficiently high, i.e. w > µ2ε. For intermediate
wage levels, i.e. σε < w < µ2ε, changes in the interest rate can generate as well as eliminate
ruiners. In fact when the wage is in this range, a direct switch from a fini-work to a fini-
mix LRD is no longer possible. As R increases the LRD must first move from fini-work
to zero-mix. Only then it could go through a fini-mix and eventually become infi-rent.
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Figure 8: Case with high effort cost.
Ruiners can emerge because the actual value of wealth received from the previous gen-
eration may not be high enough to convince an agent at the same time not to work and to
leave a positive wealth. For a given bequest, as the interest rate reaches a certain threshold,
the agent is induced to transmit a positive wealth so that the initial ruiner at higher interest
rates becomes a dilapidator. For analogous reasons, as the interest rate increases further,
the dilapidator becomes a rentier.
The analysis of Figures 6-8 also point to the fact that the higher the effort cost the less
plausible is to have a dynasty of all workers. In fact when the cost of effort is high (Figure
8) a fini-work LRD exists only for a very small range (and low values) of w and R. In
particular a fini-work LRD exists only for wages strictly lower than µ2ε, implying that it
is no longer possible to go directly from a fini-work to a fini-mix LRD. In the remaining
cases the effect of an increase in R is equivalent to the ones discussed above. 
Appendix F – Exogenous wage growth.
When wages grow at fixed positive rate γ, i.e. wt = (1 + γ)
tw0, the threshold Xt is no
longer constant over time. In fact, when at a certain period T the wage becomes sufficiently
high (i.e. wT = (1 + γ)
Tw0 > max{µ2ε, σε}), the threshold Xt is represented by X t and in
period T + t is therefore XT+t(wT ) = (1 + γ)
twT/(e
ξ − 1)− ε. This threshold increases over
time in a convex way and tends towards infinity. While the threshold X still exists, this is
no longer the case for the finite threshold X˜ that can be accumulated by an infinite sequence
of workers when βR < 1.
In fact, starting from any given value of XT and wT , successive iterations of wealth
according to the dynamic equation XT+t+1 = βR[wT+t+1 +XT+t − σε] lead to:
XT+t(wT ) = wT [(1 + γ)
T+tβR + (1 + γ)T+t−1(βR)2 + ... + (1 + γ)T+1(βR)t]
−σε[βR + (βR)2 + ...+ (βR)t] + (βR)tXT (wT )
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Independent of X0, there always exists a date T
′ such that XT ′+t converges towards
+∞ as t goes to +∞. Therefore, independent of βR, the wealth accumulated by a infinite
sequence of workers eventually goes to infinity. Importantly, there always exists a T
′′
such
that cx−d > 0, where c = (1+γ)T
′′
w0, x = βR, and d = w0/(e
ξ−1). By letting a = XT ≥ 0,
b = σε and y = 1 + γ it follows that:
Jt = XT ′′+t−XT ′′+t(wT ′′) = ax
t−b(x+x2+ ...+xt)+yt
[
cx−d+
cx2
y
+
cx3
y2
+ ...+
cxt
yt−1
]
+ε,
and, since y > 1 and cx > d, limt→+∞ Jt = +∞. Consequently, even if the threshold
of wealth above which an agent decides not to work increases and tends towards infinity,
eventually the wealth accumulated by a sequence of workers is even greater, that is XT ′′+t >
XT ′′+t, and it is also greater than X̂. Hence, when wages grow at a fixed positive rate,
independent of X0, there are only two possible cases: a infi-mix LRD when βR < 1 or a
infi-rent LRD when βR > 1. 
Appendix G – Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 when et is continuous.
We show that the results of Section 2 hold when et is continuous.
Assume that an agent chooses et and xt+1 in order to maximize (1) subject to the budget
constraint Ωt = wtet+Rtxt and et ≥ 0. Therefore, given xt, an agent maximizes: φ(xt+1, et) =
(1− β) ln
[
wtet +Rtxt − xt+1
]
+ β ln
[
ε+ xt+1
]
− ξet.
• It follows that the desired bequests xˇt+1 satisfies: φ
′
x(xˇt+1, et) = −(1−β)/(Ωt− xˇt+1)+
β/(ε + xˇt+1) = 0. Hence: xˇt+1 = βΩt − (1 − β)ε. Taking into account the non-negativity
bequest constraint xt+1 = max{xˇt+1, 0} we obtain (2). Then, Proposition 1 does not depend
on the fact that et is a discrete or continuous variable.
• When et is a continuous variable, the desired effort eˇt satisfies: φ
′
e(xt+1, eˇt) = (1 −
β)wt/(Ωt − xt+1) − ξ = 0. Merging this condition with the preceding, φ
′
x(xˇt+1, et) = 0,
allows to obtain x˜t+1 = βwt/ξ − ε and e˜t = 1/ξ − (ε+Xt)/wt. Then, using (2) and the two
non-negative constraints xt+1 ≥ 0 and et ≥ 0, it is easy to show that:
et =

max
{1− β
ξ
−
Xt
wt
, 0
}
if wt <
ξε
β
max
{1
ξ
−
(ε+Xt)
wt
, 0
}
if wt ≥
ξε
β
Consequently, we have established that there exists a positive threshold Xt [equal to
(1 − β)wt/ξ if wt < ξε/β and to wt/ξ − ε if wt ≥ ξε/β], increasing in wt but independent
of Rt, such that an agent living in t decides not to exert effort if and only if his inherited
wealth Xt = Rtxt is greater than Xt. Then, Proposition 2 does not depend on the fact that
et is a discrete or continuous variable. 
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